A Taxonomy of Monopolistic Pricing by Sibly, H & Marsden, A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 2008-04 
 
 
 
 
A Taxonomy of Monopolistic Pricing 
 
 
 
 
Ann Marsden and Hugh Sibly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ISSN 1443-8593 
ISBN 978-1-86295-474-8
 
A Taxonomy of Monopolistic Pricing* 
 
 
 
Ann Marsden  
 
Hugh Sibly 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Economics and Finance 
University of Tasmania 
Private Bag 85 
Hobart Tasmania 7001 
 
 
 
 
July 2008 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Textbooks present the three ‘degrees’ of price discrimination as a sequence of independent 
pricing methods. These textbook treatments consequently provide inadequate insight as to 
when a firm might adopt a particular pricing strategy. The paper describes an information-
based taxonomy of price discrimination, which can be used to teach monopolistic price 
discrimination in an integrated way. The pricing strategy adopted by firms is based on the 
information on consumer demand available to it. The paper proposes a method for ranking 
profit and efficiency levels under different price discrimination strategies. The information-
based taxonomy is compared to the traditional textbook approach.  
 
                                                 
* We would like to thank David Prentice for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors remain our 
responsibility.  
A Taxonomy of Monopolistic Pricing 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Price discrimination is observed in daily life. Students can purchase bus tickets at a 
discounted rate, once they have provided evidence that they are a student (usually by 
producing their student cards). They can often buy bundles of bus tickets at a cheaper per unit 
price than one bus ticket. In these examples the students are paying different prices to other 
travellers for the same trip on the bus.  In explaining such behaviour textbooks usually adopt 
the taxonomy proposed by Pigou (1920), whereby examples of price discrimination are 
placed in one of three types (degrees).  
 
A difficulty with the Pigouvian taxonomy used by textbooks is that it treats the types (or 
degrees) of price discrimination as a sequence of independent pricing methods. In the 
example of bus tickets, the textbook explanation for the quantity discount is different to that 
for the student discount These textbook treatments consequently provide little insight as to 
when a firm might adopt third degree price discrimination as opposed to second degree price 
discrimination or when a firm might use a mix of third and second degree price 
discrimination strategies. Recent literature takes the view that the price discrimination 
strategy adopted by the firm is associated with the information on consumer demand 
available to it. To this end, this paper describes an information-based taxonomy of price 
discrimination, and shows how it can be used to teach monopolistic pricing, including price 
discrimination, in an integrated way. 
 
Typically textbooks present first, third and sometimes second degree price discrimination, 
and treat these types of price discrimination as analytically distinct. Indeed the technical 
treatments are usually incompatible with one another. First-degree price discrimination is 
necessarily discussed in terms of nonlinear pricing when customers purchase more than one 
unit. It is common to see an analysis involving two consumers whose demand curve for the 
good differ. The firm maximises profit (and incidentally social surplus) by charging a tariff to 
each customer type equal to total benefit for the efficient quantity for that customer type 
(which occurs where the type’s marginal benefit equals marginal cost). Third degree price 
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discrimination is discussed in the context of linear pricing. Invariably textbooks consider two 
groups of customers whose market demand curves have different elasticities. The firm sets 
price to each group at the point where the marginal revenue of the group is equal to marginal 
cost.  
 
The modern textbook treatment of second-degree price discrimination (e.g. Tirole 1988, and 
Carlton and Perloff 2004) differs from that identified by Pigou (1920). There is some 
confusion regarding Pigou’s original definition of second-degree price discrimination. Many 
recent writers include self-selection via non-linear pricing as a form of price discrimination. 
Stole (2007) notes that Pigou (1920) did not consider second degree price discrimination as a 
selection mechanism, but rather thought of it as an approximation of first degree using a step 
function below the consumer’s demand curve. As such, Pigou regarded both first and second-
degree price discrimination as “scarcely ever practicable” and ‘of academic interest only”.  
 
The modern treatment of second-degree price discrimination, beginning with Spence (1977) 
and Maskin and Riley (1984), utilizes modern advances in information economics to 
explicitly model the information asymmetry between a firm and its customer. Whereas first-
degree price discrimination is used when each customer’s type is common knowledge, 
second-degree price discrimination is used when a customer’s type is private information 
(known only to the customer herself). Under second-degree price discrimination nonlinear 
pricing schedules are used to provide customers with an incentive to self identify. The 
modern textbook treatment of second-degree price discrimination usually follows this 
approach. These treatments consider two customer types, one of whose demand curve lies 
uniformly above the other. Non-linear prices are used to provide an incentive for customers 
to reveal their types. Examples of such non-linear pricing are abundant, so Pigou was 
incorrect in asserting that second-degree price discrimination is ‘of academic interest only’. 
 
Teaching the three types of price discrimination using the (inconsistent) Pigouvian taxonomy 
can be confusing. In contrast, by systematically modifying the information available to the 
firm regarding the distribution of customer demands, we identify the optimal (discriminatory) 
pricing strategy available to firms. We thus provide an integrated treatment of the incentives 
for price discrimination and propose an approach that allows students to view the firm’s 
profit level as a function of the optimal mix of second and third degree price discrimination 
strategies.   
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Observation of firms indicates that in many cases they do not use either second or third but 
approach their pricing using a mix of the two types of price discrimination. This is the case 
for the bus company discussed above. Similarly cinemas offer both student discounts and 
discounts for quantity. Accommodation providers offer a corporate and leisure rate, as well as 
discounts for extended stays. The framework we propose readily models this behaviour. We 
will use non-linear pricing strategies to demonstrate this approach. We will show that a firm 
has an incentive to use non-linear pricing rather than linear pricing where possible.  
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First we outline the assumptions regarding consumer 
demand. Then we identify the optimal non-linear pricing strategy given the information 
structure. Then the profitability and efficiency of each pricing strategy is ranked. This 
ranking is related to the information structure. Finally the analysis using nonlinear pricing is 
related to the traditional analysis of (third degree) price discrimination using linear pricing.  
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2. Customer Demand 
 
We start with the assumption that the firm, which is a monopoly, is aware of the distribution 
of customers’ demand curves (and thus can calculate market demand), but it may not be able 
to costlessly associate a demand curve with a particular customer. It is also useful to restrict 
consideration to those cases in which demand curves of different customer types do not cross. 
This provides an unambiguous ranking of customers in terms of their willingness to pay, thus 
a particular customer types can be identified as having a higher or lower demand than other 
customer types. This condition is know variously as ‘uniform ordering’, the ‘sorting 
condition’ the ‘single crossing condition’ or the ‘Spence-Mirlees’ condition’. The same 
demand curves can then be used throughout the analysis of first, second and third degree 
price discrimination thereby providing students with a framework that is analytically self-
contained. 
 
We further restrict attention to the case in which there are three customer types. Discussions 
of price discrimination in the textbooks generally consider only two customer types. 
However, to consider the examples of price discrimination discussed in the introduction, and 
to develop a conceptually encompassing information-based taxonomy, requires a minimum 
of three customer types. The analysis could be extended to more customer types but this 
yields little additional economic insight. Thus for ease of presentation we restrict 
consideration to three customer types. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the condition for three types of customers: Customers H (high demand), 
M (medium demand) and L (low demand). We will use the same demand curves throughout 
the analysis in the following section. Note that under this condition type H customers have a 
higher total valuation (H0>M0>L0) and higher marginal valuation (P 0 H>P
0
 M >P
0
L) of any level 
of provision of the good.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
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3. Price Discrimination with Nonlinear Pricing  
 
The pricing strategy adopted by the firm depends on how readily it can identify customers as 
belonging to the different types. Below we consider the cases in which (i) the firm can 
costlessly identify each customer’s type, (ii) can costlessly identify only one type of 
customer, (iii) cannot identify any customer’s type. In order to conduct price discrimination it 
is necessary that the firm can prevent resale. We will also assume for simplicity that marginal 
cost for the firm is equal to zero.  
 
3.1 All Customer Types Costlessly Identified 
 
We will start by considering the case where a given customer’s type is common knowledge, 
and thus firms can costlessly identify and separate the three customer types. This corresponds 
to first-degree price discrimination in the textbooks. The firm can capture all the consumer 
surplus of each customer type by offering each customer a block tariff (or equivalently a two-
part tariff of a lump sum fee and no charge per unit). 
 
The optimal pricing structure in this case is shown in Figure 1. Type L customers are offered 
schedule <q*L,L1>, which consists of a bundle of q*L units for tariff equal to L1. This schedule 
leaves the consumer with zero consumer surplus, so the customer is indifferent between 
purchasing the bundle or not purchasing it. For ease of analysis assume that the customer 
purchases the bundle when indifferent. Similarly type M customers are offered the schedule 
<q *M ,M1> where M1=L1+ΔM1 and Type H are offered the schedule <q*H,H1> where 
H1=M1+ΔH1. The number of Type H customers is NH, the number of Type M customers is 
NM and the number of Type L customers is NL. Profit is equal to: 
 
Π1 = NLL1 + NMM1+ NHH1  
 
Note that each customer purchases the efficient quantity. 
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3.2 One Customer Type Costlessly Identified 
 
Next assume the firm can costlessly identify (and thus separate) Type L customers. However 
it cannot costlessly distinguish between Type M customers and Type H customers. The profit 
maximising pricing strategy requires the firm to separate customers according to the freely 
available information. In particular each identifiable groups of customers potentially contains 
within it customers with heterogenous demands e.g. Type M and Type H.  
 
The firm has to set schedule that ensures Type M and Type H customers self select the 
appropriate bundle. Figure 2 shows how the nonlinear pricing can be used by the firm to 
profitably separate the type M and type H customers.  
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
The firm offers two schedules <q 3M,M3> and <q
3
H,H3>. The former schedule is directed at type 
M customers and the latter type H customers. It is profit maximising for the firm to extract 
the entire consumer surplus from type M customers. Self-selection requires that the type H 
customers not purchase the schedule <q 3M,M3>. This means that the high demand customers 
must be guaranteed a consumer surplus V3H. The maximum consumer surplus the firm can 
extract from type H customers given this self-selection constraint occurs when q3H =q*H and 
H3=H1-V3H. 
 
The firm’s problem is then to choose the profit maximising level of q 3M. Note that as the firm 
reduces q 3M by one unit the revenue from the tariff paid by type M customers reduces by 
NMP
3
M, as P
3
M  is the marginal valuation of type M customers. At the same time the tariff paid 
by type H customers can be increased by NH(P
3
H-P
3
M) and still satisfy self selection. The profit 
maximising level of q 3M satisfies NMP
3
M = NH(P
3
H-P
3
M). Firm profit is thus given by: 
 
Π3 = NLL1 + NMM3 + NH(H1-V
3
H) 
 
where  M3 < H1-V3H. The deadweight loss is given by NM(M1- M3). 
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Note that if NMP
3
M < NH(P
3
H-P
3
M) for all q, then it is profit maximising to set q
3
M = 0. This can 
happen in two ways: 
 
(i) the ratio of P3H to P
3
M may be sufficiently high 
(ii) the ratio of NH to NM may be sufficiently high.  
 
In this case the firm offers only one schedule to type M and H customers:  <q*H,H1>. This 
bundle is purchased only by type H customers.  If, on the other hand, NMP
3
M > NH(P
3
H-P
3
M) for 
q=0 it must be the case that q 3M>0. In this case the firm offers two schedules as described 
above.  
 
Two variants of the information structure assumed above can be readily analysed:  
(i) the firm can costlessly separate type M customers from type L and type H customers, but 
cannot distinguish between type L and type H customers and (ii) the firm can costlessly 
separate type H from type L and type M customers, but cannot distinguish between Type L 
and Type M customers. The analysis of these information structures is analogous to the 
analysis above. 
 
The methodology used in this subsection can be used when the firm has incomplete 
information on customer types. In these cases the firm maximises profit by firstly using 
costlessly available information to separate its customers into groups and then further 
separating these groups into sub-groups of uniform type using the nonlinear pricing schedules 
as a screening method. Within the groups the customers with the highest demand receive a 
positive consumer surplus and lower demand customers buy a bundle with inefficient 
quantity. By offering the lower demand customers an inefficient quantity the lower demand 
bundles becomes less of a substitute for the highest demand bundle. 
 
The information available to firms in the case considered in this subsection corresponds to 
Pigouvian third degree price discrimination to the extent that the firm observes groups and 
within these groups there may be a number of different customer types. In this example the 
two groups consist of (i) Type L only and (ii) both Type M and Type H customers. However 
it differs from Pigouvian third degree price discrimination in that screening methods are used 
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to separate customers within the group.1 This difference allows the pricing strategies 
described in the introduction to be explained.  
 
3.3 No Customer Types Costlessly Identified 
 
Finally consider the case in which the firm cannot costlessly identify and separate any of the 
three customer types. This case is sometimes called ‘second degree price discrimination’ in 
the modern literature. In this case the firm does not have the option of using exogenously 
provided information (such as a student card or geographical location) to separate customers, 
but must devise a pricing strategy that identifies a customer type through self-selection. The 
optimal pricing strategy does this by using pricing schedules in the same way that it separated 
type M and Type H customers in Section 3.2. 
 
The determination of the optimal pricing structure is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 
 
 
The firm offers three schedules <q2L,L2>,  <q
2
M,M2> and <q
2
H,H2>, directed at type L,  type M 
and type H customers respectively. It is profit maximising for the firm to extract the entire 
consumer surplus from type L customers. Self-selection requires that the type M (and H) 
customers not purchase the schedule <q2L,L2>. This means that the medium demand 
customers must be guaranteed a consumer surplus V 2M. The profit maximising level of q
2
L 
satisfies NLP
2
L = NM(P
2
M-P
2
L). At this point the revenue lost by reducing q
2
L from type L 
customers (NLP
2
L) is just offset by the gain in revenue from type M customers (NM(P
2
M-P
2
L)). 
 
Self-selection requires that type H customers do not purchase the schedule <q 2M,M2>. This 
requires that type H customers be guaranteed a consumer surplus of V2H. The profit 
maximising level of q 2M satisfies NMP
2
M = NH(P
2
H-P
2
M). At this point the revenue lost by 
reducing q 2M from type M customers (NMP
2
M) is just offset by the gain in revenue from type H 
                                                 
1 Note that textbook treatments of third degree price discrimination also assume the firm sets a linear price 
(rather than non-linear price) to each group because they have insufficient information to further separate 
customers within the groups. This issues is explored further in section 4. 
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customers (NH(P
2
H-P
2
M)). Hence q
2
M= q
3
M and V
2
H = V
2
M +V
3
H. Note that if type H customers do 
not purchase <q 2M,M2>, they would not purchase <q
2
L,L2> as it provides a lower consumer 
surplus.  
 
As in the analysis in the previous section, it is optimal for the firm to set q2H= q*H and to set a 
fee, H2=H1-V2H, which is just low enough to deter type H customers from switching to other 
bundles. 
 
In this case Type L customers buy an inefficient quantity and keep no consumer surplus, 
Type M customers buy an inefficient quantity and retain some consumer surplus and Type H 
customers buy an efficient quantity and retain some consumer surplus. Profit is now: 
 
Π2= NLL2 + NM(M3- V
2
M)+ NH(H1 – V
2
M - V
3
H) 
 
Type H customers buy the efficient quantity q*H, Type M customers buy the inefficient 
quantity q 2M and Type L customers buy the inefficient quantity, q
2
L. The deadweight loss is 
given by NM(M1- M3) +NL(L1- L2). 
 
The above analysis was based on the assumption that q 2M> q
2
L where q
2
M satisfies NMP
2
M = 
NH(P
2
H-P
2
M) and q
2
L satisfies NLP
2
L = NM(P
2
M-P
2
L). Note that it is possible that these expression 
yield values of q 2M and q
2
L such that q
2
M< q
2
L. This would be possible if NM  is relatively small 
compared with NL and NH. Clearly this outcome is not consistent with self-selection. In this 
case ‘bunching’ occurs. There is no separate bundle offered to type M, and both type L and 
type M customers purchase <q2L,L2>. In this case q
2
L is determined by (NL+NM)P
2
L = NH(P
2
H-P
2
M
). 
 
 
3.4 Profit and Efficiency Ranking with Nonlinear Pricing  
 
Since profit varies with the level of information that a firm has about its customers we can 
now show how to rank profit levels using our information-based taxonomy. The firm makes 
the maximum possible profit when it can costlessly identify and separate each customer and 
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offer them a non-linear price that captures their entire consumer surplus. Specifically profit 
is: 
 
Π1 = NLL1 + NMM1+ NHH1  
 
Profit is lower than this maximum when only one customer type rather than all customer 
types can be costlessly identified and separated. If only type L customers can be costlessly 
identified and separated profit is lower than Π1 because (i) there is a lower fee paid by type M 
customer because they purchase only q 3M (fee M3) rather than q
*
M (fee M1) and (ii) Type H pay 
a lower fee of H1 –V
3
H rather than H1. Mathematically the difference in profit is: 
 
Π1-Π3= NM(M1-M3) + NH V
3
H  
 
The difference in profit is the information cost of separating type M customers. The 
deadweight loss increases by NM(M1-M3). 
 
Profit is even lower when no customer types rather than one customer type can be 
costlessly identified and separated for three reasons: (i) there is a lower fee paid by type L 
customer because they purchase only q2L (fee L2) rather than q
*
L (fee L1) (ii) there is a lower 
fee paid by type M customers as they pay a fee of M3- V 2M rather than M3 and (iii) Type H 
pay a lower fee of H1 – V
2
M - V
3
H rather than H1 –V
3
H. Mathematically the difference in profit 
is: 
 
Π3-Π2= NL(L1-L2) + NMV
2
M + NHV
2
M  
 
The difference in profit is the information cost of identifying and separating type L 
customers. The deadweight loss increases by NL(L1-L2)  
 
In summary, the less capable is the firm to identify a customer’s type (and the more it must 
rely on self selection), the lower is its profit. Thus the information on customer type can be 
viewed as a valuable commodity. The more the firm must rely on pricing strategies to reveal 
a customers type the greater is the deadweight loss.  
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4. Price Discrimination with Linear Prices  
 
Why do firms not offer different schedules to every single customer where there are large 
numbers of customers with different willingness to pay? It has been shown that the firm 
maximises profit using the information costlessly available to them or failing that, use non-
linear pricing strategies to separate customers so the question should be addressed. The 
answer is often that in reality the firm cannot use such nonlinear pricing strategies because 
there are a great many customer types (a wide dispersion of customer demand) and the good 
can be resold. If the firm cannot prevent resale it must offer a linear price (i.e. a common 
price per unit) to all customers in order to prevent arbitrage. If the firm did attempt to offer 
separate schedules to different customer types only the schedule with the lowest price would 
sell. This price would become the market price. Thus, when the firm cannot prevent resale, 
we can think of the firm as setting a linear price. 
 
Third degree price discrimination under the Pigouvian Taxonomy occurs when there is both 
linear pricing and exogenous information as to a customer’s type (or group which may 
consist of many different types). We now relate this type of price discrimination, which is 
ubiquitous in textbook treatments, to the analysis presented above.  
 
Figure 4 shows textbook (Pigouvian) third degree price discrimination cast in a manner that 
facilitates comparison with the above analysis. Assume two customer types (the minimum 
number of types needed to consider the implications), which are labelled M and H. Suppose 
the firm is constrained to set linear prices.2 If the firm cannot identify a particular customer’s 
types it must set a common linear price. This is the case of a simple monopoly. The profit 
maximising, common linear price is shown as PC, and the firm maximum profit when the 
firm cannot identify customer type is thus: 
 
ΠC = NM(MB+MD)+ NH(HD+HE) 
                                                 
2. Note that the firm would prefer to use a non-linear price rather than a linear price This is demonstrated by 
showing that the firm can increase profit by switching to a non-linear price from a linear price. If the firm could 
prevent resale (and thus profitably conduct non-linear pricing), it could sell a bundle consisting of qCM to type M 
customers for a fee of MA+MB+MD, and sell a bundle of qCH to type H customers for a fee of MA+HD+HE. This 
strategy increases the profit per customer by MA and additionally satisfies self-selection. Hence using non-linear 
pricing increases profit relative to linear pricing. Of course the firm can maximise profits by adopting the 
pricing described in section 3.2 (figure 2). We thus assume that the firm is exogenously forced to set a linear 
price so that we can compare textbook treatments of third degree price discrimination with the above analysis. 
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The deadweight loss is: 
 
NM(MC+ ME+ MF)+ NHHF 
 
Now consider the case in which the firm can costlessly identify customers by their type. This 
is the case of third degree price discrimination in the Pigouvian taxonomy. The usual 
textbook examples of student discount on cinema tickets and geographical separation applies 
to this requirement. The linear price PTM is charged to type M customers, who purchase 
quantity qTM, and the linear price P
T
H is charged to type H customers, who purchase quantity q
T
H
. The firm’s profit is: 
 
ΠT = NM(MD+ME)+ NH(HB+HD) 
 
The deadweight loss is: NMMF+ NH(HC+ HE+HF) 
 
The impact of the move from common linear pricing to third degree (linear) price 
discrimination changes profit by: 
 
ΔΠ = NM(ME-MB)+ NH(HB-HE) 
 
as type H has inelastic demand and type M has elastic demand ΔΠ>0. Thus the firm is able to 
utilise the information identifying customer type to increase its profit. This result is consistent 
with the analysis above. 
 
However, in contrast to the above analysis, deadweight loss does not reduce as firms are 
provided with additional information. Specifically, if the firm moves from common linear 
pricing to third degree (linear) price discrimination the deadweight loss increases by: 
 
NH(HC+ HE) -NM(MC+ ME) 
 
This expression is negative when demand curves are linear and output is unchanged but may 
not be negative in other cases. (Robinson 1933) showed that the movement toward third 
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degree discriminating prices alters the distribution of output but does not change total output 
when demand curves are linear. (Schmalensee 1981) showed that deadweight loss increases 
unless output increases. Thus, when demand curves are linear, the implementation of third 
degree price discrimination increases deadweight loss. This is apparent from figure 4 once it 
is realised that with linear demand curves NM(q
T
M-q
C
M) must equal NH(q
C
H- q
T
H).  
 
Thus, when output does not increase, the provision of information on customer type that 
allows the firm to implement third degree price discrimination lowers welfare. This 
conclusion, implicit in textbook treatments, is the opposite of the result presented in section 
3.4. The source of the divergence in the conclusion is due to the use (by the Pigouvian 
Taxonomy) of linear pricing rather than nonlinear pricing. This results in the firm reducing 
output to the type H customers in an attempt to capture their consumer surplus. The output 
supplied to type M customer however increases. This result contrasts to that obtained in 
section 3.4 for non-linear pricing, where output supplied to type M customers decreases due 
to implementation of price discrimination.  
 
Thus the conclusions derived from the textbook analysis of (Pigouvian) third degree price 
discrimination follows from the joint assumptions of linear pricing and exogenous 
information on customer types (groups). The ability to set differing linear prices to different 
groups can be justified by assuming while there may be resale within a group, it cannot occur 
between them. This may be a reasonable assumption in many of the cases discussed in 
textbook treatments, e.g. geographic separation. However the requirements for this, and 
other, forms of price discrimination to be profit maximising should be made clear to students. 
Our treatment ensures this occurs.   
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5. Conclusions 
 
When a market consists of more than one customer type a firm can maximise its profits by 
charging different types different prices. Thus information on customer types is valuable to 
firms. When it is common knowledge the firm benefits by using it. However a given 
customer’s type is invariably private information. In these cases non-linear pricing schedules 
can be use to provide customers with an incentive to reveal their type. However extracting 
this information comes at a cost to the firm: profit is lower than would be the case if 
customers’ types were common information. In addition the optimal screening method 
distorts the quantity available to low demand customers and thus generates a deadweight loss. 
 
We have shown how the theory of price discrimination can be developed using an 
information-based taxonomy. This approach allows for a more coherent understanding of the 
different strategies adopted by firms. It is emphasises that firms use price discrimination 
strategies as a means of maximising profit given the particular information constraints they 
face. This approach enables a straightforward explanation of the pricing strategies used by 
firms in many common real world examples. 
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